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In 1964, the United States Supreme Court overruled a decision by the State of 
Ohio to ban a French film for obscenity, after local cinema manager Nico Jacobellis 
was convicted for showing Les Amants by Louis Malle (1958). Jacobellis appealed the 
decision and took Ohio State to the Supreme Court, claiming his First Amendment 
right to free speech. The Supreme Court had to determine whether or not the film was 
pornographic and thus legally subjected to censorship. Judges eventually decided that 
the film was not “hard-core pornography” and was therefore protected by the 
Constitution. The now famous trial became textbook history (Gerwitz, 1996) when 
Justice Potter Stewart made his concluding statement:  
 I shall not today attempt further to define the kinds of material I understand 
to be embraced within that shorthand description [hard-cord pornography]; 
and perhaps I could never succeed in intelligibly doing so. But I know it 
when I see it, and the motion picture involved in this case is not that.  
Justice Steward understood the elusive and contradictory nature of genre: we 
cannot define it but we use it instinctively and mostly appropriately in our daily lives. 
In this regard, the judge was – no doubt unconsciously – following Wittgenstein’s 






following rules, but the meaning and “labelling” of things and concepts are not, in 
fact, preparatory to their use; rather, signification appears through our daily enactment 
of language games (Wittgenstein, 2001, 1, p. 26-32). The problem with genre is that 
like other language games, intuitions and uses vary with place and time; the Jacobellis 
trial is a typical case and a fitting starting point to our reflection on the notion of 
genre.  
In this article, I will argue that the essential difficulty of genre is that it is both a 
blurry concept and a very familiar one. This article is the result of a keynote speech 
presented at the Coldoc International Linguistics Conference in November 2013. The 
conference theme was the question of genre in written and oral discourse. Such a 
broad concept is variously defined according to theoretical points of view and 
objectives, but most importantly, the question of genre enables us to reflect on the 
relationship between the descriptive function of genre categorization in discourse, and 
the socially prescriptive nature of generic rules in our everyday or recreational language 
use. My aim here is not to present a definite and exhaustive definition of genre, but 
rather to raise a number of issues contained in our underlying assumptions on genre, 
and to examine genre as a discourse categorization intrinsically vulnerable to failure 
and ambiguity. I will examine two cases of genre misunderstanding in literary and 
academic discourse: Orson Welles’s 1938 radio adaptation of H. G. Wells’s War of the 
World, and Alan Sokal’s 1996 “hoax” with the respected academic journal Social Text. 
Both cases are revelatory of a politics of genre in the academic world and in society as 
a whole.  
II. Definitions and issues 
Genre is a fuzzy concept with a long and evolving history alternating 
prescriptive injunctions and investigative descriptions. From Aristotle to the 19th 
century tradition of literary genre taxonomy, to Bakhtin, Todorov and contemporary 
linguistics, the notion of genre has been a central concern to many disciplines, of 
which rhetoric and literary studies are only the tip of the iceberg. My aim here is not to 
review the entire literature on genre, but instead to present a few definitions from 
theoretical approaches within the English-speaking literature (cognitive linguistics, 
systemic functional linguistics, rhetoric, and anthropological linguistics), and to draw 
from them a number of recurring issues that will then help us examine our specific 
cases of “genre misunderstanding.” In his Cognitive Grammar, Langacker defines genre 
laconically as “any recognizable type of linguistic production” (2008, p. 478). 
For Langacker, genres are “based on cultural scenarios representing familiar 
kinds of linguistic interaction”; a scenario includes a purpose and a specific 
viewing arrangement, distinct from canonical face-to-face interaction (Ibid. p. 478). 
This puts genre at the heart of conventional human practices. Similarly, rhetoric 
professor Carolyn Miller considers genre as “typified rhetorical action” (1984, p. 151), 
thus further emphasizing the notion of intentional action within a conventional 
framework of practices, and introducing the notion of stereotype. Martin and Rose, of 
the Sydney school of systemic functional linguistics, define genres as “staged, goal-
oriented social processes” (2008, p. 6), crucially suggesting that genres are not definite 
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categories but evolving practices. The question of social practices leads us to that of 
discourse communities. John Swales introduces the notion in his seminal study Genre 
Analysis:  
 A genre comprises a class of communicative events, the members of which 
share some set of communicative purposes. These purposes are recognized by 
the expert members of the parent discourse community, and thereby constitute 
the rationale for the genre. This rationale shapes the schematic structure of the 
discourse and influences and constrains choice of content and style. (1990, p. 58) 
While a speech community is a distinct group of individuals whose members 
share the same norms and functional rules that determine the appropriateness of 
utterances, a discourse community is sociorhetorical rather than sociolinguistic. It 
consists of a “group of people who link up in order to pursue objective that are prior 
to those of socialization or solidarity, even if these latter should consequently occur. In 
a discourse community, the communicative needs of the goals tend to predominate in 
the development and maintenance of its discoursal characteristics” (Swales 1990, 
p. 24). The rules of genre are therefore goal-oriented, with the implicit requirement 
that individual communicative purposes must fit those of the discourse community, in 
order to maintain homogeneous genre distinctions. This, of course, is highly unstable 
in contexts of creative discourse where originality and individuality take precedence 
over canonical rules.  
Finally, let us look at William Foley’s anthropological definition of genre. Foley 
focuses on historical stratification: genres are the result of a building process through 
“intertextuality,” which means that any individual “enactment” of a given genre 
require the previous acquisition of a culture of genre. 
 Genres are historically situated ways for constructing and interpreting texts, an 
interpretive set of principles linking historically transmitted schemes for framing 
linguistic performances. These frames for interpreting of framing devices are 
typically dialogic, juxtaposing language drawn from various historical sources, 
and it is from this intertextuality that much of the power of individual genres 
derives. (…) Genres do not exist as abstract categories, but only as schemes of 
interpretation which are enacted in particular performances. (1997, p. 377) 
Shared knowledge and the culture of genre bring me to the question of genre 
literacy: the ability to identify and use genre appropriately in various contexts. Not 
surprisingly, many linguists working on genre are especially concerned with its 
applicability in the field of education, through genre learning and genre literacy. 
Several problems are at stake: from a descriptive point of view, the reality of discourse 
and the social norms attached to genre are historical and thus subject to change. Thus 
the emergence, evolution and disappearance of genre categories mean that they cannot 
be examined as stable concepts. Secondly, if genre literacy is both a language skill and 
a social skill, how does it work: does our usage-based knowledge of genre rely on 
family resemblance, on stereotypical models, or both? From a normative point of 
view, genre is a rule-based game, which makes it a sociologically marked question:  
the differentiated levels of access to generic norms and standards are signifiers of 




appropriated by linguists and is not solely relegated to the realm of literary criticism – 
whose historical purpose is the assessment and inclusion of emerging works in the 
corpus of canonical literature – it remains inseparable from issues of normativity. 
From a meta-linguistic point of view, our use of genre in discourse analysis reveals our 
perception and, to a certain extent, reproduction of our own social context, hierarchies 
and dynamics. 
Let us now turn to understandings of genre in the English-speaking literary 
tradition, with a canonical classic of modernist literature: James Joyce’s Portrait of the 
Artist as a Young Man (1916). In Portrait, first-person narrator and Joyce alter ego 
Stephen Dedalus ponders the meaning of life and the role of the artist, and his own 
relationship with language. In the following quote, Stephen attempts to define art, and 
his reflections are particularly relevant to the question of genre: 
 What I have said (…) refers to beauty in the wider sense of the word, in the 
sense which the word has in the literary tradition. In the marketplace it has 
another sense. (…) art necessarily divides itself into three forms progressing 
from one to the next (…) the lyrical form, the form wherein the artist presents 
his image in immediate relation to himself; the epical form, the form wherein he 
presents his image in mediate relation to himself and to others; the dramatic 
form, the form wherein he presents his image in immediate relation to others. 
(…) Is a chair finely made tragic or comic? Is the portrait of Mona Lisa good if I desire to see 
it? If not, why not? (…) If a man hacking in fury at a block of wood, Stephen continued, 
make there an image of a cow, is that image a work of art? If not, why not? (1996, p. 243-4) 
Stephen proposes a generic classification largely inspired by Aristotle and 
Thomas Aquinas. His remarks raise four important points. First, the question of 
subjectivity and inter-subjectivity in language: what effectively creates the “mediate 
relation to [oneself] and to others” in art is its dialogic dimension? Like art, genre is 
determined by the kind of relationship the speaker/writer/artist maintains with his 
audience. Secondly, Stephen questions the very notion of category by challenging the 
validity of stable criteria in generic descriptions of discourses and works of art. 
Stephen also hints at the importance of cultural contexts: what makes the chair comic 
or tragic is largely a question of tradition and conventions – or, as Foley puts it, the 
cumulative, anthropological intertextuality of human practices affects our understanding 
of the chair. Stephen’s third issue, which is also a crucial point of Joyce’s novel, is the 
question of evaluative judgment, bringing us back to appropriateness and the literary 
canon. Finally, Stephen, who is an aspiring artist, is obsessed with authorial intention 
and purpose: his anguished questions remind us that authorial purpose is not always 
felicitous, since the overall meaning and genre of utterances and discourses largely rely 
on uptake and interpretation. Last but not least, Stephen makes a crucial distinction, in 
this excerpt, between “beauty” (i.e. art) in the “literary tradition” and beauty “in the 
marketplace.” For Stephen, the marketplace lies outside art and academia, and refers 
to popular culture – the culture that is consumed by the masses. This is all the more 
relevant to our analysis as the term “genre” is very commonly used in the English-
speaking world to distinguish high-brow literature from “genre fiction,” i.e. 
productions of lower aesthetic and intellectual standards but successful and financially 
profitable. “Genre literature” is a label that goes beyond the practical categories of 
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bookselling and marketing to shed light on the notion of genre as a whole. Also called 
“genre fiction,” “popular fiction,” “category fiction,” or “commercial fiction” in the 
publishing industry, it reproduces the old distinction between high and low culture, 
and brings us back to speech communities and social status.  
In a humorous 2001 article for the Observer, journalist Robert McCrum attempts 
to define literature: “What is ‘literary fiction’? To many, it’s the titles on the short list 
for the Booker Prize” (2001, online). McCrum goes on to explain his understanding of 
“highbrow” and calls for an end to the literary versus genre distinction. This 
widespread distinction goes back to 20th century philosophers Blanchot and Derrida, 
who claimed that post-modernist fiction and deconstructionism, by putting forward 
intertextuality and promoting the subversion of traditional conventions, were moving 
beyond genre (Blanchot 1959, p. 243-4 ; Derrida 1980, p. 55-81). Yet, as Jean-Marie 
Schaeffer remarked about Blanchot’s dismissal of genre, the post-modernists’ 
subversive injunction is equally genre-based (Schaeffer, 1995, p. 627). There is no way 
out of genericity, but rather a continuum; any text and language production can be 
classified according to contextual relevance and its engagement with readers/co-
speakers’ expectations. While the “genre” label is usually restricted to the commercial, 
“lowbrow” categories of fiction, this can lead to schizophrenic nonsense: contemporary 
author and Booker Prize winner John Banville has been hailed as one of the best Irish 
prose authors of his generation, yet he publishes crime fiction under the pseudonym 
Benjamin Black. This should not imply that the Benjamin Black stories are less worthy 
of literary attention, or that they are simply marketed for a different, less demanding 
readership. The following diagram presents another humorous attempt at mapping the 
genre/literary continuum, with “stuff” corresponding to non-realistic, entirely made-
up fiction unrelated to everyday experience, such as space travel and outlandish serial 






This diagram crucially points to the question of consumption: commercial 
“genre” fiction is addressed to a specific audience that is a clearly defined marketing 
target. In that respect, a specific genre must be easily recognizable and relevant to the 
target in question: it must elicit maximum uptake and minimum cognitive effort from 
its readership, following Sperber and Wilson’s relevance principle (2004, p. 610). This 
brings us back to the function of stereotypes and formulaicity in genre recognition: 
commercial genre literature is a formulaic kind of discourse, enabling easy production 
and consumption in an era of industrialized mass culture. However, even Kardos’s 
diagram does not follow this logic. It features The Haunting of Hill House as its closest 
illustration of the “genre” section, far from the literary recognition of William 
Faulkner’s The Sound and the Fury. The Haunting of Hill House is a 1959 ghost story; it 
checks the “stuff” criterion; it sits halfway between “easy” and “difficult,” thus 
straddling the high-brow/low-brow divide; but it was also a finalist for the 1959 
National Book Awards, whose mission is to “celebrate the best of American literature, 
(…) and to enhance the cultural value of good writing in America.”1 The book is 
therefore both part of the lowbrow genre section for marketing purposes, and a 
celebrated part of the canon of 20th century American literature.  
Other examples from this diagram humorously reveal the intrinsic ambiguity of 
the two meta-genres (is Salman Rushdie’s The Satanic Verses not a work of literature?), 
which brings us back to Derrida’s rejection of the oppressive “law of genre”: texts and 
discourses participate in, rather than belong to, a genre, and the “mark” of genre does 
not betray the essence of a text but simply signals a referential relationship to pre-
existing conventions and practices. Thus generic games become an intrinsic part  
of literary creativity when authors deliberately rely on generic ambiguity or parody 
stereotypical generic traits to engage with contrasting traditions and unsettle their 
readers’ expectations. Yet such ambiguities also lead to potentially conflicting 
interpretations, and we now need to examine those discrepancies. Since some genres 
are recognizable thanks to their closeness to cognitive-prescriptive models and 
conventions, what do misunderstandings tell us about genre? What do pragmatic and 
cognitive discrepancy suggest about the elusive nature of genre as a working concept 
in discourse analysis and literary criticism? The following cases caused generic issues at 
the time of their broadcast/publications, with far-reaching consequences.  
III. Orson Welles and The war of the worlds: mars attacks! 
Orson Welles’s 1938 radio broadcast of The War of the Worlds is sometimes 
called a hoax, when it was in fact an explicit fiction, erroneously taken for a real-life 
news report on an invasion of the United States by aliens. Welles adapted British 
author H. G. Wells’s 1898 novel about the invasion and rule of Southern England by 
the Martians. Wells, who also wrote The Invisible Man, The Time Machine, and The Island 
of Doctor Moreau, is now considered a father of the science-fiction genre. When The War 
of the Worlds came out, however, the genre did not exist as such, and his novel was 
                                                        
1 National Book Foundation, http://www.nationalbook.org/aboutus_history.html#.U9pn1ai34is, 
accessed July 31, 2014. 
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called a “scientific romance” following the taxonomy of the time. Orson Welles 
adapted Wells’s story to fit an hour-long program in the series The Mercury Theatre on the 
Air on the CBS network. He produced, directed and acted in the program, which was 
broadcast live on October 30 – Halloween night. Welles changed the time and space 
setting of the fiction to make it a contemporary narrative set in New Jersey. As is now 
notoriously known, the story exceeded Orson Welles’ expectations, and the next day, 
national and regional newspapers reported a wave of “panic” and “terror” in response 
to what they called Welles’s shameful hoax and “fake radio war” (Campbell, 2010, 
p. 27). The reported panic was largely a myth created by the printed press, although 
the program did have a powerful effect on listeners, many of whom were left badly 
confused. An unusually large volume of calls was received that night in police stations, 
fire departments and local newspapers, from casual listeners enquiring about the 
generic status of the program: was it a news bulletin of a Martian attack near 
Princeton, New Jersey, or a powerfully enacted and particularly convincing piece of 
fiction? Such confusion leads us to our first question regarding Welles’s “hoax”: the 
role of literary adaptation in genre misunderstandings.  
To adapt the novel for the radio and make it relevant to his contemporary 
American listeners, Welles transferred the story from late nineteenth century England 
to the fictional “Wilmuth farm”, located in the (real) town of Grovers Mill, New 
Jersey, near Princeton University. The time of the story is in fact not exactly 
contemporary to listeners but set a year later, in 1939. The change of medium, from 
text to oral enactment, is of course crucial here, since radio broadcasting offers 
something that a book does not: it is immaterial, it enables actors to dramatize a text 
rather than simply read it, and it brings in sound effects. Welles had also banned 
adverts for the whole hour, thus allowing for a creative use of interruptions and 
interludes to maintain several layers of fiction within the program. The medium of 
radio also affects the chronological framing of fiction: even though Welles did 
announce the program as a fictional piece when he started, casual listeners tuning in 
mid-program would not have had the warning. Welles’s first announcement is very 
clear: “The Columbia Broadcasting System and its affiliated stations present Orson 
Welles and the Mercury Theatre on the Air in The War of  the Worlds by H. G. Wells” 
(opening sequence). Perhaps conscious of  the ambiguity that might have been generated 
by his convincing reading, Welles inserted another warning forty minutes into the 
program: 
 You are listening to a CBS presentation of Orson Welles and the Mercury 
Theatre on the Air in an original dramatization of The War of the Worlds by H. G. 
Wells. The performance will continue after a brief intermission. This is the 
Columbia Broadcasting System.  
Finally, Welles concluded the program with a general disclaimer, urging 
listeners to remain aware of the difference between reality and fiction: 
 This is Orson Welles, ladies and gentlemen, out of character to assure you that 
The War of The Worlds has no further significance than as the holiday offering it 
was intended to be. The Mercury Theatre's own radio version of dressing up in a 




While those three announcements correspond to the pragmatic contract 
established with readers in written literature, the dramatization and direct address of 
the radio collapses narrative frames and bypasses the other conventions of written 
fiction: narration becomes enactment, without the reassuring visual space of a book or 
a stage. Welles’s use of the present tense of live description further confused listeners: 
the program was structurally – if not thematically – realistic, not formally distinct from 
an actual news report. This seeming lack of fictional framing was what the printed 
press blamed Welles for, suggesting that his “fake story” was intentional deceit, and 
therefore a form of social transgression to be punished.  
The program made use of simulated news bulletins, borrowing from a genre 
familiar to American audiences. The fictional “on-the-scene” reports of the alien ship 
also made creative use of a familiar trope in news-radio programming. Using such 
familiar genres in a fictional context was indeed unprecedented, so that listeners had 
no fictional expectations when faced with the “news flashes” that punctuated the 
program. The historical context was also instrumental in creating a panic among some 
listeners: this was October 1938. America was following the ongoing war scares in 
Europe. During this very tense period, listeners had become accustomed to news 
bulletins interrupting entertainment programs with war news, first with the Anschluss 
in March, and then with Germany marching into Sudetenland on October first. To say 
that listeners were ripe and ready for an invasion story would be an understatement; 
whether Orson Welles used the historical context to his advantage and for an extra 
dose of realism is not known, but he certainly drew inspiration from it in writing his 
Alien script. By collapsing all narrative levels into one and inserting pretend “bulletins” 
within his narrative, Welles did more than call for his listeners’ suspension of disbelief, 
he forced it. His final remarks on the fictional status of texts are all the more 
significant: 
 We annihilated the world before your very ears, and utterly destroyed the C. B. 
S. You will be relieved, I hope, to learn that we didn't mean it, and that both 
institutions are still open for business. So goodbye everybody, and remember the 
terrible lesson you learned tonight. That grinning, glowing, globular invader of 
your living room is an inhabitant of the pumpkin patch, and if your doorbell 
rings and nobody's there, that was no Martian … it's Halloween. 
Here, Orson Welles suggests that the effects of fiction are powerfully real: 
fiction elicits excitement, terror or laughter in its audience; this, however, does not 
mean that fiction is a form of deceit, contrary to what the newspaper claimed the next 
day.  
Although there were no public disturbances of any sort, Welles was subjected 
to a violent media backlash immediately after his program was broadcast. This brings 
us back to the normative dimension of the “laws” of genre, and to the politics of 
genre. While the newspaper relished the sensationalism of their panic stories – thus 
reminding us that journalistic narratives often borrow heavily from sensationalist 
fiction – they very strongly condemned Orson Welles, and called for stronger 
censorship and regulation of the discursive genres broadcast on the radio. The New 
York Times, among others, chimed in:  
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 In the broadcast of the The War of the Worlds blood-curdling fiction was offered 
in exactly the manner that real news would have been given and interwoven with 
convincing actualities… Radio officials should have thought twice before 
mingling this new technique with fiction so terrifying (Campbell, 2010, p. 42).  
However hypocritical the newspapers were, their reactions showed that Welles 
had overstepped a number of implicit generic boundaries. In 1938, radio was a very 
popular medium, albeit still relatively young – the CBS network had started only 10 
years earlier. The radio-versus-newspaper rivalry goes back to the 1920s but tensed in 
the 1930s, when radio took the lead in news reporting thanks to its ability to 
communicate breaking news instantly, especially during the 1938 war scares. Following 
Orson Welles’s broadcast, a few individuals attempted legal actions (one sued CBS for 
causing “mental anguish”), but none were successful. The most significant backlash 
came from official censorship: “Federal Communications Commission chairman 
Frank McNinch quickly obtained informal agreement from the radio networks that 
fictional news “flashes” would not be used again” (Pooley and Socolow 2013, online). 
Ultimately, Pooley & Socolow suggest, the “panic myth” surrounding Welles’s The War 
of the Worlds serves as a cautionary tale warning us of the power of media over our 
lives. More importantly, I would argue, the story is a tale of two genres and a lesson in 
genre politics.  
First, genre is related to both thematic content and the structural form of 
discourses or texts. Welles’s alien story leans towards science fiction, while its use of 
“flash bulletins” pulls it towards journalistic discourse and therefore (since his 
narrative does not correspond to reality), towards deceptiveness: it becomes a “hoax.” 
Secondly, literary adaptations transform genres, in this case from prose fiction to 
drama, with the added discrepancy of written narrative vs. broadcast speech. This 
results in confusion and misunderstanding, or, depending on your point of view, in the 
successful game of make-believe that is convincing fiction. Thirdly, generic ambiguity 
is related to pragmatic expectations: the audience does not recognise Welles’s piece as 
science fiction because is contradicts their primary use of the radio as a news source. 
Playing with the generic features of narratives therefore means transforming a 
relatively stable horizon of expectation for the users of genre. The various reactions 
elicited by the original 1938 broadcast reveal the different degrees of genre literacy 
throughout society, thus exposing a social divide between those “in the know” and 
those without access to the conventions and techniques of literary genre-bending. In 
the American context of the 1930s in which identity is largely about recognition, 
misunderstanding (i.e. not recognising) genres has political and social consequences: 
Welles was accused of being unpatriotic for confusing his fellow citizens in a time of 
trouble. Finally, Welles’s radio broadcast exposes genre as part of the production and 
consumption of mass communication, and therefore as a crucial player in social, 
political, and economic human relations.  
 
Orson Welles’s adaptation was called a hoax when it was in fact a sincere piece 
of fiction: rather than a deliberate faking of genre, it can be considered a case of 
misunderstanding related to genre literacy. Let us now turn to a case of deliberate 




Sokal’s 1996 academic article, aptly and no doubt ironically titled “Transgressing the 
Boundaries,” is one such case.  
IV. Conclusion: “Transgressing the boundaries: towards a transformative 
hermeneutics of quantum gravity.” 
In 1996, New York University Professor Alan Sokal published an article in  
the academic journal of post-modern cultural studies Social Text (1996: 217-252).  
His article was entitled “Transgressing the boundaries: towards a transformative 
hermeneutics of quantum gravity” and is still available online. According to Sokal 
himself, the article was deliberately full of errors and unsubstantiated argumentation. 
Calling for “progressive” science and arguing against the “patriarchal” and “reactionary” 
nature of mathematics, Sokal’s article challenged mathematical science as politically 
and ideologically motivated, eventually questioning the validity of notions such as 
objective reality and mathematical logic altogether. The article concludes thus: 
 (…) a liberatory science cannot be complete without a profound revision of the 
canon of mathematics. As yet no such emancipatory mathematics exists, and we 
can only speculate upon its eventual content. We can see hints of it in the 
multidimensional and nonlinear logic of fuzzy systems theory; but this approach 
is still heavily marked by its origins in the crisis of late-capitalist production 
relations. Catastrophe theory, with its dialectical emphases on smoothness/ 
discontinuity and metamorphosis/unfolding, will indubitably play a major role in 
the future mathematics; but much theoretical work remains to be done before 
this approach can become a concrete tool of progressive political praxis. Finally, 
chaos theory – which provides our deepest insights into the ubiquitous yet 
mysterious phenomenon of nonlinearity – will be central to all future 
mathematics. (1996, p. 252) 
Sokal imitates the style and common tropes of deconstructionist cultural theory 
and contemporary American literary criticism. This should therefore be considered a 
parody, but it was not recognised as such by the editors of Social Text, who selected 
and published the article as a serious piece, taking its message literally. Only with 
hindsight, then, can we label this text a parodic piece. On the other hand, any physicist 
or mathematician would have identified the article as a fake, which brings us back to 
the determination of a genre community. The success of Sokal’s hoax relied entirely 
on its restrictive understanding of “genre community”: the experts reading and editing 
his piece were not experts in the field of mathematics, and simply assumed the 
sincerity of the author, following the basic principles of cooperative communication. 
Two reasons can explain the editors’ mistake regarding the article’s contents: first, the 
excessive specialisation of academic disciplines makes it more difficult for publishers 
to find competent readers for every article they publish. This paves the way for 
potential errors. Second, as Sokal suggested in the midst of the “affair,” publishers are 
often sensitive to their prospective authors’ status: a tenured Professor at NYU has 
better chances of being published regardless of the intrinsic quality of his production. 
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As a speech act, Sokal’s article thus denounces the weaknesses of an excessively 
restrictive genre community. 
Sokal revealed his hoax in the May/June issue of Lingua Franca, a journal 
focusing on academic life and debates in the United States, shortly after Social Text 
published his article. Significantly, he regards his piece as an “experiment”:  
 I decided to try a modest (though admittedly uncontrolled) experiment: Would a 
leading North American journal of cultural studies – whose editorial collective 
includes such luminaries as Fredric Jameson and Andrew Ross – publish an 
article liberally salted with nonsense if (a) it sounded good and (b) it flattered the 
editors’ ideological preconceptions?” (1996, online) 
For Sokal, the piece was an explicit parody, recognisable as such by any 
competent physicist or mathematician, but “evidently, the editors of Social Text felt 
comfortable publishing an article on quantum physics without bothering to consult 
anyone knowledgeable in the subject.” Sokal then describes his article as an 
assemblage of postmodernist quotes strung together without argument: “one finds 
only citations of authority, plays on words, strained analogies and bald assertions.” For 
Sokal, this clearly summarizes a specific genre, that of deconstructionist philosophy 
and post-modern American cultural studies.  
Sokal’s hoax sparked long-running debates in newspapers and academic 
journals from both sides of the Atlantic, including Lingua Franca, Dissent, Tikkun, Le 
Monde, and Physics Today. This in turn prompted follow-ups in book form: Fashionable 
Nonsense (1998) and Beyond the Hoax (2008). The intensity of the debate is in my view 
not simply a case of academic war (an old genre in itself); it stems from the threatening 
nature of the hoax to the genre of academic writing as a whole. Sokal’s hoax contains 
two separate speech acts: the deceitful submission of the text, and the contents of the 
text itself. According to the editors of Social Text, the fact that Sokal was not serious 
when he submitted his article is not relevant: the text itself carried an intrinsic 
intellectual value regardless of its author’s overall intentions. More importantly, Sokal’s 
article questions the relevance of genre itself: it plays on the expectations and 
preconceptions of a specific genre community to show how overly strong formal 
generic conventions affect our ability to follow the common principles of relevance 
and cooperative communication. It also raises the question of the generic features of a 
parodic text, both literally and pragmatically. Can Sokal’s article be called a parody if it 
is not recognised as such? Finding the generic features of such hoaxes brings us to the 
distinction between serious and non-serious discourse. From a literary point of view, 
textual hoaxes can be considered a tradition, from Swift’s 1729 Modest Proposal to 
Beckett’s 1930 paper “Concentrism and Jean Du Chas” at Trinity College Dublin, we 
are faced with spoofs and parodies that entertain or challenge but do not fool their 
audiences.   
 
Throughout the course of this paper, I have examined what makes genre 
literacy a social question involving communities and social norms of acceptability.  
My final remarks will leave some of these questions open. The generic features  
of “hoaxes” seem to reside solely in the pragmatic strategy and context of their 




is clearly one of stereotypical formats, as opposed to an examination of textual and 
discursive contents. His purely formal definition of genre leads me to a final 
experiment, that of The Postmodernism Generator. The Postmodernism Generator is 
an automatic system generating random texts from recursive grammars.2 It can be 
viewed as a form of automatic parody, favouring form over substance, the end-result 
being often nonsensical. The Generator provides a meta-textual comment on the 
generic features of post-modernist theory, and more generally, on all generic traits in 
texts and discourses. Automatically generated texts are a form of industrialized 
production in which the practices and conventions of genres are converted into 
mathematical constraints. The successes and failures of such designs both denounce 
the rigidity of genre conventions and fail to acknowledge the subtlety and range of 
generic discourse, leaving us with our initial ambiguity and the undefinability of genre. 
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